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英美政策制定者似乎平静地看待其国内房价近期出现的上涨。我们被告知,只要通货膨胀率和失业率都不出现突然高涨,现有的房价水平就会持续下去,不会威胁经济增长。
British and American policymakers appear to regard the recent period of house price inflation in their countries with equanimity. As long as neither inflation nor unemployment soars suddenly, we are told, the current level of house prices is sustainable and economic growth is not threatened. mmkey-com
然而,不是所有的央行人士都对此高枕无忧。上个月,荷兰央行总裁魏霖克(Nout Wellink)警告说,房地产繁荣的遗留问题很可能使未来经济低迷状况更加恶化。荷兰的经验和历史上出现过的房地产繁荣都表明,这一建议值得认真对待。然而,主要的英美经济体要想轻易地摆脱房地产泡沫带来的后果,可能有点为时已晚。
But not all central bankers are so insouciant. Nout Wellink, president of the Dutch central bank, last month warned that a hangover from the property boom could well exacerbate the next downturn. Both the Dutch experience and the history of housing booms suggest that this counsel deserves to be taken seriously. However, it is probably already too late for the leading Anglo-Saxon economies to escape lightly from the consequences of their property bubbles.
90年代末,荷兰的经济在欧洲最为成功。当时,荷兰的房价和住房信贷都以两位数的速度增长。随着房屋所有者纷纷出售现有房产以购买更多房产,荷兰的储蓄率迅速下跌(从1997年占收入的13%以上,降到3年后的不到7%)。
In the late 1990s, the Netherlands had one of the most successful economies in Europe. At the time, both Dutch house prices and household credit growth were rising at double-digit rates. As homeowners cashed in on their burgeoning home equity, the Dutch savings ratio collapsed (from more than 13 per cent of income in 1997 to less than 7 per cent three years later).
1999年利率开始攀升后,荷兰房市开始降温。第二年,房价停止上涨。与此同时,住房信贷增长放缓,房屋净值抵押贷款办理金额从1999年的100亿欧元(130亿美元),下降到2002年的50亿欧元。这对消费产生了抑制作用。随着消费者信心陡然下跌和失业率攀升,荷兰的居民储蓄开始增加。房地产繁荣结束3年后,荷兰经济开始出现紧缩。
The Dutch housing market cooled after interest rates began climbing in 1999. The following year, house-price inflation came to a halt. Household credit growth slowed simultaneously mortgage equity withdrawal fell from €10bn ($13bn) in 1999 to €5bn in 2002. This had an adverse effect on consumption. As consumer confidence dipped and unemployment climbed, the Dutch began to save more. Three years after the end of the housing boom, the economy contracted.
其它一些国家房地产泡沫终结后,都出现了长期经济低迷、金融体系更加脆弱、政府财政赤字增加以及货币不稳定状况。
The end of housing bubbles in other countries has been associated with periods of prolonged economic weakness, increasing financial fragility, rising government deficits and the appearance of monetary instability. mmkey-com
与主流观点看法不同的人认为:房价下跌会为整体经济带来严重问题;但其实即使房价不下跌,整体经济也有可能出现严重的问题。房价只要停止上涨,信贷增长速度通常就会放缓,从而引导房产持有人增加储蓄,减少消费。这样做,最佳结局是经济增长速度减缓,荷兰就是这种情况;而最坏的情况,是经济增长严重减速,失业率飙升,国家进入艰难的经济衰退期,90年代初期的日本、英国和斯堪的纳维亚半岛国家就是这种情况。
Contrary to popular perception it is not necessary for house prices to fall to create a serious problem for the economy at large. When house prices merely cease rising, the rate of credit growth normally slows, inducing householders to save more and spend less. At best, this produces a mild drag on the economy, as has been the case in the Netherlands. At worst, the economy undergoes a severe slowdown with soaring unemployment and a painful recession as occurred in Japan, the UK and Scandinavia in the early 1990s.
然而,不仅仅借款方会因房地产市场崩溃遭受损失。不良贷款增加还会恶化贷款方的资产负债表。这通常会引发信贷危机,有些情况下,还可能引发全面的银行危机。比如, 30年代,“合众国银行”(Bank of the United States)在大萧条(Great Depression)初期倒闭,很大程度上是由于房地产贷款损失。此外,由于无力还贷的家庭坚持不从住宅中搬出,以及贷款方拖延在政治上不受欢迎、花费昂贵的抵押物赎回程序,因此,银行系统可能必须在多年的时间里应付房地产市场崩溃的后续影响。
But it is not just borrowers who are hurt by a housing market collapse. Rising levels of bad debt inflict damage on lenders' balance sheets. This often leads to a credit crunch and sometimes to a full-blown banking crisis. The failure of the Bank of United States in 1930 for instance, at the start of the Great Depression, was due largely to losses on property lending. Furthermore, as over-indebted households cling tenaciously to their homes and lenders delay the politically unpopular and costly process of foreclosure, the banking system may have to deal with the aftermath of a housing crash for many years.
房地产繁荣结束后,政府财政状况通常会恶化。这是因为政府要大力采用财政政策,避免经济进一步衰退。自90年代初房地产泡沫结束以来,日本政府债务在国内生产总值(GDP)中的百分比已经增加了一倍多,目前已超过国民收入的160%。
Government finances commonly deteriorate after housing booms end, as fiscal policy is employed aggressively to prevent the economy from slumping further. Since the end of the property bubble in the early 1990s, Japanese government debt as a percentage of gross domestic product has more than doubled and currently exceeds 160 per cent of national income.
房地产繁荣引发的负债过高,还可能给萧条时期的经济带来通货紧缩压力。在家庭资产负债状况因房价下跌而恶化、消费信心低落时,消费者可能会不计成本的借款偿付债务。出现这种情况时,货币政策就会失去刺激经济增长的效力,价格也会出现下跌趋势。30年代,经济学家约翰•梅纳德•凯恩斯(John Maynard Keynes)最先确定了“流动性陷阱”(liquidity trap)现象;90年代,这种现象在日本再次出现。
Over-indebtedness born of the housing boom may also contribute to deflationary pressures during the bust. When household balance sheets are damaged by falling house prices and confidence is low, consumers may start repaying their debts regardless of the cost of borrowing. When this happens, monetary policy loses its power to stimulate the economy and prices tend to fall. The “liquidity trap”, first identified by John Maynard Keynes in the 1930s, reappeared in Japan during the 1990s.
繁荣并非一定以通货紧缩为终点。由于房地产繁荣的主要问题是负债过高这一遗留问题,因此,货币当局可通过引发通货膨胀的方式,以降低未付房产债务的实际价值。70年代中期的英国,迅速上涨的物价缓解了房地产繁荣的后遗症。
The boom does not have to end in deflation. As the main problem of the housing boom is a legacy of over-indebtedness, the authorities may induce inflation to diminish the real value of outstanding household debt. Soaring inflation mitigated the aftermath of the UK housing boom in the mid-1970s.
现在,荷兰央行总裁开始为房地产繁荣带给经济的“人为刺激”(按照他的说法)感到遗憾。由于英国和美国的房地产市场可能因利率上调而遭受影响,美国联邦储备银行(Federal Reserve)和英格兰银行(Bank of England)的官员可能很快便要领教同样惨痛的教训。
The head of the Dutch central bank now regrets what he calls the “artificial stimulus” provided to the economy by the housing boom. With the housing markets in the UK and the US vulnerable to rising interest rates, officials at the Federal Reserve and the Bank of England may shortly be forced to learn the same painful lesson.